Note on conditions for marriage grant

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Southern Sector

No. 3
Date: 15 Rajab 1438 corresponding to…[12 April 2017]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Praise be to God alone and prayers and peace be upon the one after whom there is no prophet. As for what follows:

To the brother the wali (may God help him and make his steps right), as-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu. As for what follows:

After checking with the financial brother on the issue of marriage grant for the brother Abu Ali al-Tahari, the following has become clear:

Among the conditions to obtain a marriage grant is that a whole year must have passed for the brother since the date he gave allegiance. The brother Abu Ali al-Tahari has not fulfilled this condition yet since he left the Dawla then undertook the training camp again.

And God is the guarantor of success and the one who guides to the straight path

Stamp and signature

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa/southern sector
The amir

Fuel allotment receipt, Dabiq Division

Islamic State
Dabiq Division
Fortifications


No. 033

[In handwriting: allotment]

Name: Azzam
Work:
Substance: Mazut, body [?]
Quantity: 220
Type of car:

Recipient’s signature:

Date: 8 Jumada al-Awal 1438 AH [5 February 2017 CE]

Diwan al-Jund
Dabiq Division
Engineering- Fortifications/Administrator

Death Certificate, Wilayat al-Baraka

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Baraka
Judiciary and Grievances Centre


No.
Date:

Death certificate

To…according to the request raised by…in case number…on date…corresponding to…and after hearing the evidence from the witnesses…it has been proven to the court that….has died…whose mother is…on date…corresponding to…

On the basis of all the preceding, a Shari’i death certificate has been granted…

Personnel list, Wilayat Halab

No.SectorWork assigned withPrevious placeNameCapable of fighting
1AdministrationHead of the Muslima maintenance officeSalah al-Din al-Ayyubi al-FaruqAbu Ra’id al-ShamiWounded
2AdministrationPoliceal-Bara’ bin MalikKhattab al-ShamiUnknown
3AdministrationSector amir’s office in al-Ma‘muraOmar bin al-Khattab BattalionAbu Mahmud al-ShamiPerforming ribat with Abu Nu‘aym
4AdministrationInquiries officeThe wilaya- woundedAbu Hafs al-SafaraniPolice
5Administration The wilaya- woundedAbu al-‘Abbas al-‘Omari 
6AdministrationAirport and ribat squadronal-Ghandura policeAbu Hudhayfa al-Badrani 
7AdministrationSector administrator Abu al-Layth al-ShamiWounded
8AdministrationImplementeral-Bara’ bin Malik BattalionAbu al-Layth al-AnsariCapable
9AdministrationShawwal assignmentManbij sectorAbu Ishaq al-Ansari 
10AdministrationShari‘i of the sector Abu ‘Amro al-Qurashi 
11AdministrationTracking committee Abu Salman al-Muhajir [crossed out]Transferred
12AdministrationAffairs of the mujahidinal-Bara’ bin MalikAbu Abd al-Nasir al-SafaraniGood
13AdministrationInquiries officeOmar bin al-Khattab BattalionAbu Mahmud al-Safarani al-ShamiGood
14AdministrationAffairs of the mujahidinWilayat al-BarakaAbu Saleh al-KhafajiWounded
15AdministrationInquiries office0Abu Qutayba al-Fadhli[Illegible]
16AdministrationAffairs of the mujahidinManbij sectorBattar al-Dulaymi [crossed out]Trasnferred
17AdministrationAmir of the sector Abu Hafs al-MuhajirCapable
18AdministrationMilitary amir Abu Yusuf Dar al-FathCapable
19Administration Al-Faruq Hamza bin ‘Abd al-MuttalibAbu Ibrahim al-Makhzumi [crossed out]Transferred
20AdministrationSector amir’s office in Hattin complexal-Furqan BrigadeAbu Abd al-Aziz al-ShamiElderly
21AdministrationPersonnel recordManbij: those transferredAbu al-Walid al-MasriPersonnel  record
22AdministrationAffairs of the mujahidinWilayat HomsAbu Hamza al-ShamiWounded
23AdministrationArming official in the sector Abu Musa al-MuwahhidCapable
24Administration Manbij- checkpointsAbu Abdo al-Ansari 
25AdministrationFinancial official of the sector Abu Yusuf ObaydFinancial official
26AdministrationSector amir’s office- al-Khafsa Abu Nu’aym al-AnsariAdministrator
27AdministrationSector amir’s office (Muslim masses) Abu Husayn al-SalafiSector amir’s office
28Administration PrisonerAbu Darwish al-AnsariCapable
29AdministrationFortifications Al-Qa‘qa’ al-IrhabiCapable
30AdministrationImplementer Abu al-Furqan al-AnsariAdministrator
31AdministrationImplementer Abu Muhammad MuslimaAbsent
32AdministrationAssistant official for arming Abu al-Harith NasirEducation/capable
33AdministrationImplementer Abu al-Tayyib al-MuwahhidCapable
34AdministrationAffairs of the mujahidinOmar bin al-Khattab BattalionAbu Sulaym al-AnsariCapable
35AdministrationSector amir’s office in al-Ma‘mura Abu Sulayman al-ZubaydiWounded
36AdministrationFortifications Abu Ibrahim BatushiCapable
37AdministrationSector amir’s office in al-Ma‘mura Abu Faysal al-AnsariCapable
38AdministrationComplaints office in al-JuwaymManbij sectorAbu Mutwakkil al-TurkiCapable
39AdministrationImplementer Abu al-Mu‘tazz al-AnsariWounded

Receipt: Diwan al-Khidamat (Homs)

Islamic State
Wilayat Homs
Vehicles of the Diwan al-Khidamat al-Aama

This receipt is subject to financial oversight and any manipulation of prices will expose the owner of the goods to accountability and referral to the oversight and inspection commission.


No. 951

Date: / /143…AH corresponding to / /201… CE

Required from the respected…..who lives in….

No.Total valueType of goods and their characteristicsNumberIndividual priceNotes
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     

List of Hisba Personnel, Wilayat Halab




Islamic State
Wilayat Halab
Hisba centre

No.
Date:
Corresponding to:

List of personnel of the Hisba sector on date 15 Rabi’ al-Awal 1438 AH [14 December 2016]

Hisba centre

No.NameWork assigned withAbility [to be mobilised?]ResidenceCurrent status
1Abu al-Mu‘tasim al-QurashiHead of centreAbleMuslimaCentre
2Abu Sara al-QasimiAdministratorAbleAl-RaqqaAbsent since 13 Rabi‘ al-Awal
3Abu Abdullah al-ManariShari‘iAbleAl-RaqqaAl-Bab
4Abu ‘Amir al-OmawiFinancial officialAbleMuslimaCentre
5Abu al-Zubayr al-JazrawiTrackingAbleAl-RaqqaBringing a medical report
6Abu Munir al-SafraniSector’s vehiclesAbleAl-RaqqaMobilised
7Abu Muhammad al-MuwahhidTrackingAbleGhaza KabirMobilisation

Muslima sector

1Abu Omar al-ShamiHead of officeAbleMuslimaMuslima office
2Abu Malik al-JazrawiSector administratorUnableMuslimaMuslima office
3Abu Osama al-MaghribiShari‘i official of the sectorAbleMuslimaMuslima office
4Abu Mu‘adh al-ShuyukhiWomen’s divisionUnableMuslimaMuslima office
5Abu Mujahid al-AnsariWomen’s divisionUnableMuslimaMuslima office
6Abu Mu‘awiya al-SalafiSearch and investigationUnableMuslimaMuslima office
7Abu Husayn al-AnsariHospitals inspectorUnableMuslimaMuslima office
8Abu al-Faruq al-AnsariPrison officialUnableMuslimaPrison
9Abu ‘Uday al-DulaymiAdministrator and teacherUnableMuslimaPrison
10Abu Muhammad al-HashimiTeacherUnableMuslimaPrison
11Abu Ammar al-ShamiPrison warden  UnableMuslimaPrison
12Abu Muhammad- assigned from the sectorPrison warden  UnableMuslimaPrison

Muslima branch

13Abu Husayn al-HashimiOverseer of the branch and patrolsUnableMuslima 
14Abu Obayda MuslimaAdministratorUnableMuslima 
15Abu Fatima al-AnsariShari‘iUnableMuslima 
16Abu Hafs al-ShamiPatrolsUnableMuslima 


al-Khafsa branch (al-Habuba)

17Abu al-Yaman al-KafrawiBranch overseerUnable  
18Abu Obayda al-AnsariPatrolsUnable  
19Abu Azzam al-JazrawiPatrolsUnable  

al-Ma’mura branch

20Abu Abd al-Rahman al-DawlawiBranch overseerUnable  
21Abu Hamza al-DalamiPatrolsUnable  
22Abu Zayd al-HarithiPatrolsUnable  

al-Dibsi branch

23Abu Ali al-ShamiBranch overseerUnable  
24Abu Osama al-IrhabiPatrolsUnable  
25Jund al-Haq al-AnsariPatrolsUnable  

Albu Asi branch

26Abu Osama al-TunisiOverseer and patrolsUnable  
27Abu Ayman al-AnsariAdministratorUnable  
28Abu Jandal al-ShamiPatrolsUnable  

al-Juwaym branch

29Abu Muslima al-AnsariOverseer and patrolsUnable  
30Abu Abdullah al-ZhahiriAdministratorUnable  
31Abu al-Mughira EhtmelatPatrolsUnable  

Umm al-Amad branch

32Abu Omar al-JahilOverseer and patrolsUnable  
33Abu Amara al-AnsariAdministratorUnable  
34A brother assigned from the sectorPatrolsUnable  


al-Sadisa branch

35Abu Yahya al-JazrawiBranch overseer   
36Abu Omar al-JarabulusiPatrols   
37Abu al-Faruq al-AnsariPatrols   

Tadef branch (al-Bab)- mobilised brothers

1Abu al-Bara’ al-ShamiAdministrator and branch overseerUnable Battalion of the wilaya
2Abu Bakr al-AnsariBranch overseer and patrolsFighterRasm al-FalihBattalion of the wilaya
3Abu Qatada al-UrduniPatrolsFighterMuslimaBattalion of the wilaya
4Abu Anas al-TurkiPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya
5Abu al-Zahara’ al-FaransiPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya
6Abu Hudhayfa al-AnsariPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya
7Abu Yusuf al-ShamiPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya
8Abu Salma al-JumayliPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya
9Abu Ali al-MaqdamPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya
10Abu Ahmad al-MuwahhidAdministrator  Battalion of the wilaya
11Abu Abdullah al-HashimiPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya
12Abu Abdullah al-FuratiPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya
13Abu al-Izz al-HalabiPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya
14Abu Zakariya al-AnsariPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya
15Abu Adel al-HadhaliPatrols  Battalion of the wilaya

Absent people

1Abu Muhannad al-Tamimi (does not want to fight)Patrols [illegible- successfully learns?] Absent since 30 Safr
2Abu Muhammad al-Sunni (does not want to fight)Patrols  [illegible- successfully learns?]Absent since 9 Safr
3Hanzhala al-Makki (mobilised)Patrols  Absent since 9 Safr
4Othman al-San‘ani (capable/mobilised)Patrols  Absent since 15 Safr
5Abu Muhammad al-ShammaryPatrols  Absent since Safr
6Abu Aisha al-Dawsari (does not want to fight)Patrols [illegible- successfully learns?] Absent since 20 Safr
7Abu Abdullah al-ShimaliPatrols  Absent since 20 Safr
8Nimr al-JazrawiPatrols  Absent for more than a month
9Abu Taqi al-Din al-Qurashi (capable)Patrols  Absent for more than 10 days
10 Abu Ishaq al-ManbijiPatrols  Absence
11Abu Jihad al-IdlibiPatrols  Absence
12Abu Mu‘adh al-HalabiPatrols  Left the Dawla


Hisba’s needs:

1. Three vans (Complex branch, Women’s division for eastern Muslima countryside, Search and Investigation).

2. Three motorbikes (implementer of the Muslima sector, monitor of the medical institutions, Muslima office).

3. Five brothers (three for the complex office, one for the prison, one for Albu Asi).



Requests for the Tabuk Battalion of the Ali bin Abi Talib Division

Islamic State
Diwan al-Jund
Ali bin Abi Talib Division

Omar bin al-Khattab Brigade
No.
Date: 27 Shawwal 1437 [1 August 2016]

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To: the brothers in the military administration (may God Almighty help them)
Subject: requests of the Tabuk Battalion

As-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu

The brothers in the Tabuk Battalion are in urgent need of the following things:

– Increasing the allotments of fuels, especially mazut. This is because of the wide distances.

– Replacing individual weapons among most of the brothers as well as the medium ones on the ribat points, because they are in a bad state, and most of them are Chinese and German.

– Brothers for ribat and to open new ribat points, because there are great distances between the ribat points, which has given rise to smuggling routes for smugglers. So just imagine what it is like then for the enemy to penetrate.

– There is a problem with connections in terms of coverage as it is not present on some points and between them.

– 50 goggles for dust.

– In need of replacing two cars for the companies, and bringing a new one for the Iraq company.

– Replacing the anti-aircraft [?] cars as far as possible, because their technical state is bad (40%) and one is in need of replacing its engines.

– Shari’i military officials and not da’wa officials.

– Replacing the motorbikes and securing spare parts.

– Hilux car because of the sand and desert environment.

– Night and day vision binoculars because the land is exposed, so there is a need for reconnaissance at a distance.

– There are two mortar cannons and there have been no projectiles for some time. We also need rockets.

– Three phones for the amir, mortar and reconnaissance.

– Cash for the battalion for emergency matters.

– Reserve stock for all necessities (arms, ammunition, motorbikes, canned goods and walkie-talkies).

May God reward you best.

Administration of the Omar bin al-Khattab Brigade
Abu Abd al-Rahman Derna


“Oh God, I take refuge in You lest I should err or cause to err, or go astray or cause to astray, or be ignorant or for ignorance to be brought upon me.”

Detailed Monthly Report on the Omar bin al-Khattab Brigade

Islamic State
Diwan al-Jund
Ali bin Abi Talib Division

Omar bin al-Khattab Brigade
No.
Date: 23 Shawwal 1437 AH [28 July 2016]


In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

To: the brothers in the military administration (may God Almighty help you)
Subject: monthly report

Praise be to God alone and prayers and peace be upon the one after whom there is no prophet. As for what follows:

The following is a monthly report about the most important problems and events in the Omar bin al-Khattab Brigade

1The brigade is composed of two battalions- al-‘Adiyat and Tabuk- in addition to the military and administrative sectors. This brigade operates over a wide area stretching from the al-Sirte area (northwest Maysara) in the east up to Abu Khashab in the west on the borders of Wilayat al-Raqqa. This area is mostly a quasi-desert region with the villages in it being far apart from each other. This is also the case for the homes in one village that is almost devoid of its inhabitants, particularly those near the ribat of the brothers. This natural environment has imposed ample difficulties embodied in the growing demand for water as these areas are almost devoid of water, the great consumption of fuels because of the large areas over which the ribat points stretch, and the great deficiencies in the vehicles as a result of the rugged roads that are likely split by the brothers’ vehicles. In addition, there are other difficulties that will be explained in the pages of this report, by the permission of God Almighty.

We begin, after seeking help in God the Exalted and Almighty, with the most important problems.

1. Shari’i knowledge: meaning lack of Shari’i knowledge, particularly in the first ribat points. This is not surprising at this particular time, but it may be strange in relation to past periods. For the brother previously needed someone to give him tazkiya so he could be accepted in the recruit office. Then he would need to attain Shari’i knowledge with earnestness and effort, and get to know of matters and things that his heart must be convinced of so as to be accepted in the ranks of the mujahidin. These matters may differ between various institutions, but for the most part (and we think well of them) they have brought out true mujahidin, if we exclude intruders and those with disease in their hearts.

As for recently, we have begun to see and hear about the brother who does not know how to recite Surat al-Fatiha (so how can he pray?!) and another who does not see Erdogan as a Taghut let alone an apostate, and another who considers all the Muslim citizens and masses around him to be disbelievers, and still another who asks a member of the masses about the pillars of Islam and when the question is put back to the brother he replies to it with the three principles, and so on and so forth.

This is the case with regards to jurisprudence and doctrine. As for ethics, the council of remembrance of God has become almost absent, with its place being taken by the council of absence, showing-off and slander.

No one should understand from these words of mine that I am attacking the munasirin [supporting] brothers (this is a misunderstanding). For munasirin brothers have been steadfast, and God the Exalted and Almighty has made them steadfast at a time when mujahidin who have am long history of jihad have been tested, and the land of al-Khayr, let alone the land of al-Baraka, has not been able to accommodate them. What must be understood is that there must be a review of the procedure for accepting recruitment into the ranks of the mujahidin.

If we are to speak about acts of disobedience, the act of disobedience in smoking is gradually becoming less significant (we ask God for forgiveness and sufficiency) when we hear that a person among the so-called brothers engages in the acts of the people of Lot (and refuge is to be sought in God). And where? At the point of ribat nearest to the apostates. But the calamity is not here. This is a calamity, to be sure, but the greater calamity is when we know that this person has previously been accused of this ugly action and has been reprimanded by being transferred to Wilayat al-Baraka! And here we ask: if the matter is such, is this the solution? Has al-Baraka become tantamount to a disciplinary camp? Are the other wilayas being cleaned out at the expense of the cleanliness of al-Baraka? The worse and more bitter than this is that the reprimand of the brother took the form of sending him to ribat instead of preventing him from doing ribat. We ask God for safety and sufficiency. We hope for review of these matters.

2. The problem of small numbers at ribat points, which leads us to a great problem called takti’ [abandoning of work duties], for great numbers of the brothers are reckoned to be among the brothers of ribat, performing ribat in their houses or inside the military police prisons more than they perform ribat against the enemies of God (Almighty and Exalted is He). And here we place a question intended for the military police and military administration. When the brother engages in takti’ once, twice and three times, and you advise him without success, and you reprimand him without benefit, and you reach no result. Why should the brigade, from its military officials to administrators and performers of ribat, be tested by that person? Why should these people who engage in takti‘ be affiliated with the brigade in number, at a time when the obligation is to reckon them among the prisoners or expelled people. Do you not see in the inspection records that the number of people who engage in takti’ is estimated at 20 brothers every 10 days!! Is not the issue of people who engage in takti’ like a game of swapping hats? Every brother unwelcome in the Othman Brigade is moved to the Omar Brigade, and when he becomes unwelcome in the Omar Brigade, he is moved to the Abu Bakr Brigade and in the end, after the brothers in the military police and administration get fed up of him and cannot find a way to deal with him, he is transferred to the diwans. Thus we will have exported the corruption to the diwans and we have realised the brother’s desire for him, but after he has exhausted us and we have exhausted him??!!! Then we return with the story of a new brother engaging in takti’!!!!

3. Problem of arming: this problem is not limited to light arms but rather extends to medium and heavy weapons (if there are heavy weapons). The problem lies in the weapons that are hardly organised because of the numerous faults, beginning with the Kalashnikov rifle to PKC weapons and then passing through to anti-aircraft [?] weapons and finally mortars and Katyusha rockets, and this is the most we have.

Perhaps the question to be asked here: where are the tanks, artillery and armored vehicles? Someone else will say: we will have no use at all for them because they will be bombed and we will be killed [?- unclear because of wear to the document]. Is there not Crusader aircraft in Iraq? Is not the aircraft in Iraq ten times more intense than here? So how can the brothers there use tanks, Hummers and artillery while we cannot do so? This is an important and serious question intended for the military officials, or did God Almighty not say: “And prepare for them what you can from force and tying of horses”?

As for if we move on to talking about explosive rigging, the agony will fill our hearts. How can it be otherwise when five brothers were killed in one month by explosives we planted with our hands? Among them was the deputy amir of the brigade, the amir of a company two days ago. We ask God to accept all of them as martyrs.

Surely our explosives have killed as many of us as the disbelievers have? Where is the problem?! And how can it be resolved?

As for if we move to talking about administrative problems, the scene will be headed by two simple issues that have been made the issues of our time. They are the issues of water and mazut fuel.

i) Water: we have previously mentioned that the ribat extends over a quasi-desert area completely lacking in water. The only way to deliver water is via tankers and the rate of consumption of one point is five barrels of water every three days. This means that the brigade needs three tankers during work and one in reserve so we can guarantee that the water will reach the ribat points at the appropriate time, but the fact is that the brigade possesses two water tankers and they are in a bad technical state and they repeatedly experience fault, which forces us to transport water via tankers of the general public to relieve the situation. This entails ample problems, not the least of which is that the general public have review of the position, number of personnel and state of ribat, not to mention the huge sums that are paid to them. Is the wilaya unable to merely delivery water to its soldiers under appropriate and safe circumstances?

ii) Mazut: it is the new old problem. It is not hidden to anyone that most of the problems of the brigade are due to the specifying of 10 litres per day for the machinery. If you were to ask any military official, whether military official of a company or battalion or even sector: what is the distance that your car travels per day and how much fuel suffices for you? The amir of the battalion and his deputy would say: that he traverses a distance ranging between 80km and 200 km, and on average he needs 20 litres each day at a minimum.



One of the theoreticians will say: he can perform ribat and review the circumstances of those performing ribat, and then return to his base and put his hand on his cheek and sit. He is not required to resolve the problems of the brothers, or coordinate with the heavy weaponry department if there is enemy activity, or coordinate with his direct amir, or follow up the affairs of the points of ribat constantly, or repair his vehicle if it experiences faulty, especially if the fault is simple…

As for the brigade administration’s sole vehicle, it is required to go daily from Ruwayshad (the administration’s base) to al-Sur in order to follow up on the affairs of the brothers on leave permit, those returning or those referred, and to follow up the affairs of personnel registration and financial management with the military administration. The administration and the one responsible for it is required to directly follow up the matters in the battalions as the military official brothers desire. This is all on 10 litres per day. Someone will assert (and it may be true) that the policy is applied in Wilayat al-Khayr and affairs are good. We will say to that person that the sector of one brigade in al-Khayr like al-Hawija or al-Jabal is equivalent to the sector of one battalion in al-Baraka in terms of area, and it may be less (and the words here are those of the brother Abu ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Quriya who worked in al-Khayr for the past three years).

As for if we want to speak about the solution and we have been told that these apportionments are limited by a higher committee, we say: let them fear God for themselves and come here, ride our vehicles, measure our distances, observe the nature of our terrain, and then set the quantity of 10 litres per day, because the picture being transmitted to them is not like the actual reality. For by God they will all be held accountable before God the Exalted and Almighty. The Messenger of God (SAWS) said: “Each of you is a shepherd, and each of you is responsible for his flock.”

iii) Problem of vehicles: one need not speak long about the issue of cars. If we know that in the al-‘Adiyat battalion there are two good cars and another broken down, and another whose engine is replaced twice during one month (al-Halfawiya), then as is said: “What is written can be read from its title.” Likewise is the situation in the brigade’s administration that only possesses one vehicle through which it administers the brigade’s affairs. So if the car for food or purchases experiences a fault, then the administration’s car directly takes its place, and so the administration ends up without a car.

In simple comparison with the reality in the second brigade (Abu Bakr) and not in the other wilayas, we will find a great difference in the number of cars, which raises queries!!!

iv) The problem of motorcycles: in al-‘Adiyat this problem is still present, in that the number of motorcycles is counted at 18, most of them in poor technical state. Arrangements were made for four motorcycles, and they have not received a replacement for these four motorcycles. As for in Tabuk, a good motorcycle mechanic is needed and spare parts need to be provided for matters to be good there.

v) Regarding connections, the brigade suffers from a lack of walkie-talkies, and especially for the water tankers and kitchen. There are also no spare walkie-talkies in the event that one of the walkie-talkies on ribat has a fault (not to mention walkie-talkies for expeditions). Also there is a deficiency in chargers for the walkie-talkies because most of them have broken down on the points of ribat as a result of faulty delivery. So we hope that a good quantity of these chargers can be secured.

vi) The ribat points need day-vision and night-vision binoculars. Note the brothers on ribat have none. We also need goggles to deal with dust for the brothers when they are on duty. We have asked for them from the military administration more than once and our request has not been answered.

In conclusion, if I have got things above right, then it is because of God the Exalted and Almighty, and if I have erred, it is because of me and Satan. Have I not conveyed? Oh God, bear witness.

And may God reward you best.

Administration of the Omar bin al-Khattab Brigade
Abu al-Harith al-Shami


[At the bottom of each page]:

“Oh God, I take refuge in You lest I should err or cause to err, or go astray or cause to astray, or be ignorant or for ignorance to be brought upon me.”

Request for Employment with the Islamic State


Islamic State
Wilayat al-Raqqa- Wali’s Office
No.
Date: 10 Rabi’ al-Awal 1438 AH [9 December 2016 CE]

Request presenter: [redacted]
Date of allegiance: Muslim masses [i.e. no allegiance given to Islamic State]
Wilayat al-Raqqa
Sector/area: N/A
Work: N/A
Provincial number:
Address in detail: al-Tabqa- the third neighbourhood with one of the brothers
Phone/contact: [redacted]
Subject of request: requesting employment

Content of request

To the brother the wali of al-Raqqa (may God protect him): as-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu. As for what follows:

I am [redacted]. I am 28 years old. I migrated to the Islamic State two and a half years ago as part of the Muslim masses and I did not give allegiance. I was working in Wilayat al-Jazira as a Qur’an teacher and came to Wilayat al-Raqqa two months ago. I need help to employ me so as to obtain a salary as I am married and have daughters, and I have no house, as I live with one of the brothers.